Across the Caribbean, there is a deepening sense that the hemisphere has entered a more uncertain and finely balanced moment. Regional watchers understand that whenever great powers shift their posture, small states rarely escape the consequences.
Nowhere is that awareness sharper than in Trinidad and Tobago, where citizens are wrestling with a specific anxiety: What happens after the uniforms leave? The U.S. Marines will eventually pack up and return home; the headlines will fade, but Trinidad and Tobago will still share an active, often volatile maritime border with Venezuela. The Gulf of Paria will remain one of the most sensitive corridors in the hemisphere, and any shift in the regional balance, real or perceived, will be felt first and most intensely by those living closest to the geopolitical fault line. These are not irrational fears. They are the calculations of a population acutely aware of its geography.
It is more consequential when one considers Trinidad and Tobago’s role as the headquarters of CARICOM IMPACS, the region’s premier security institution and the operational home of the Caribbean’s most sensitive intelligence and cyber frameworks. From its offices in Port-of-Spain, IMPACS coordinates regional security policy, border harmonisation, and strategic partnerships with major international agencies. Embedded within this structure is the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC), which processes classified information on guns, gangs, trafficking routes, terrorism risks, and maritime threats. Within the RIFC, the Cyber Fusion Unit (CFU) is responsible for monitoring cyber vulnerabilities, responding to major digital attacks, and protecting the region’s critical infrastructure. These bodies form the spine of Caribbean security cooperation. They require neutrality, credibility, and trust to function.
Against this backdrop, Trinidad and Tobago’s hosting of U.S. Marine exercises at a time of heightened tension between Washington and Caracas has raised regional concern. While most CARICOM states have reaffirmed their commitment to the Zone of Peace and the broader principle of hemispheric de-escalation, Trinidad and Tobago has found itself unable to align with that posture. That divergence touches the foundation of the region’s security architecture. When the host nation of the Caribbean’s intelligence and cyber-security apparatus appears to lean toward increased U.S. military engagement, especially at a moment of geopolitical fragility, the implications ripple far beyond Port-of-Spain.
The timing amplifies the concern. The exercises are widely publicised and are happening during a fragile moment in U.S.–Venezuela relations. For regional observers, this raises doubts about Caribbean neutrality. In geopolitics, perception often becomes reality. And in a region where instability carries immediate consequences, ambiguity is a luxury small states cannot afford. Moreover, any shift in military optics can weaken CARICOM’s moral authority when advocating de-escalation and peaceful diplomacy. The Caribbean cannot credibly champion peace while one of its most strategically positioned states appears to be signalling something different.
This introduces another often unspoken but influential factor in risk perception: tourism vulnerability. Unlike much of the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is not heavily reliant on tourism. While tourism fuels many CARICOM economies, it contributes only modestly to Trinidad and Tobago’s overall economy. According to the Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2020: Trinidad & Tobago report, the direct impact of travel and tourism on GDP in 2019 was TTD 4.22 billion—only 2.6 percent of GDP, with an expected increase to 2.7 percent by 2030. The sector provided 17,500 jobs (2.8 percent of total employment) in 2019 and is projected to grow to 22,000 jobs by 2030. A country with an energy-based economy is less vulnerable to immediate effects from travel advisories, perceived instability, and changing security perceptions.
By contrast, many of Trinidad and Tobago’s Caribbean neighbours rely on tourism for 20 percent to over 60 percent of their GDP. For these economies, even the hint of militarisation, the shadow of confrontation, or the perception of instability can send visitor confidence into freefall. This could increase the risk of cancelled bookings, diverted flights, and widespread economic shock. In such a region, the shattering of peace would have disastrous consequences, destabilising livelihoods and national budgets almost overnight. This divergence in economic exposure underscores a central tension: one state’s geopolitical decisions can create economic implications for the region.
These concerns go beyond economics and touch the heart of the regional security partnership. Trust is the vital element of IMPACS. Sharing intelligence, coordinating cyber efforts, and conducting maritime surveillance all rely on confidence that sensitive information is handled impartially. When the host country of the region’s security framework shifts its stance, it fosters mistrust. Member states might hesitate to share crucial data; cyber cooperation could be viewed with more caution; and maritime collaboration may become more guarded. Once trust breaks down, the already fragile regional system will weaken.
Layered onto this is the broader hemispheric shift. The Caribbean is increasingly caught between two powerful realities: a United States intensifying its defence engagement through SOUTHCOM, and a China deepening its development footprint through infrastructure, construction, and financing. Small states are forced to navigate hard-power partnerships on one side and vital economic support on the other. In such a landscape, Trinidad and Tobago’s choices inevitably influence the strategic orientation of the entire region.
To be clear, Trinidad and Tobago has every sovereign right to determine its defence engagements. But Caribbean sovereignty depends on coherence, trust, and a commitment to avoiding the gravitational pull of great-power competition. The essential question is not whether Trinidad and Tobago can host foreign military exercises. It can. The real question is whether the nation responsible for anchoring the region’s security should be the one introducing risks that the region has collectively sought to avoid.
The Marines will leave. The statements will fade. But the geography will remain. And so will the consequences for Trinidad and Tobago and the Caribbean as a whole.